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WILL THE CERCLA BE UNBROKEN? REPAIRING THE
DAMAGE AFTER FLEET FACTORS
INTRODUCTION

In response to the increasing problems associated with abandoned and
inactive hazardous waste sites in the United States, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA" or the "Act")' in 1980.2 CERCLA established a $1.6
billion "Superfund" 3 to finance the removal of hazardous waste from disposal sites and the remediation of such sites.'
CERCLA provides three mechanisms for effectuating the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. First, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA" or the "Agency") 5 may order private parties to abate hazardous
conditions that pose "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment." '6 Second, the government
may undertake its own remedial measures and sue "potentially responsible parties" 7 to recover its expenses. Third, courts have held that private parties who voluntarily clean up hazardous waste sites may then sue
potentially responsible parties for contribution. 9
CERCLA represents a laudable attempt by the federal government to
address a problem of staggering proportions.10 The Act, however, was
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
2. See H.R1 Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 6119, 6120; United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 25 (lst
Cir. 1990).
3. Because of the large fund it created, CERCLA is commonly referred to as
"Superfund."
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)(currently codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988)).
5. CERCLA empowered the President to order potentially responsible parties to
undertake remedial action. The President, in turn, delegated this responsibility to the
EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42237 (1981), as amended by, Exec.
Order No. 12418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20891 (1983).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)(1988).
7. The term "potentially responsible parties" appears in section 104(a) of CERCLA,
see 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988), but is also commonly used to refer to the persons upon
whom section 107 imposes liability. See id. at § 9607; Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutionsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. Rev.
139, 142 n.15.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1988).
9. See Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443
(S.D. Fla. 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43
(E.D. Pa. 1982); see generally Belthoff, PrivateCost Recovery Actions UnderSection 107 of
CERCLA, 11 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 141 (1986)(discussing private cost recovery actions);
Note, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1135
(1985)(same). By now, there is "no question that section 107(a)(2)(B) 'expressly creates a
private cause of action.'" 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d
1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990)(quoting Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d
887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986)).
10. The problems associated with improper treatment of hazardous waste have been
well documented and were a driving force behind CERCLA's passage. See, eg., H. Rep.
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hastily drafted and passed" and is thus replete with ambiguity. 2 The
13
paucity of legislative history further hinders statutory interpretation.
Consequently, the federal courts have had to interpret CERCLA's vague
provisions with little Congressional guidance.' 4
One vague provision is Section 101(20)(A), which defines "owner or
operator" for the purpose of establishing parties potentially liable for
hazardous waste cleanup.' 5 Congress specifically excluded from this definition any person "who, without participating in the management of a
. . [hazardous waste] facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the ... facility."' 6 While this "secured
creditor exemption"' 7 makes plain that Congress intended to exempt secured creditors from some degree of CERCLA liability, the Act nevertheless fails to address the scope of the exemption.' 8 As a result, courts
have promulgated inconsistent interpretations of when CERCLA sub*

No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119,
6119-25 (discussing problems associated with hazardous waste); 126 Cong. Rec. 30930,
30930-36 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)(statement of Sen. Randolph)(same); Comment, supra
note 7, at 139-41 (same).
11. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984)[hereinafter NEPACCO], aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983); Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 Hastings L.J. 1261, 1263-64 &
nn. 17-18 (1987); Comment, supra note 7, at 145-46 & n.28. See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1982).
12. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91
(3rd Cir. 1988)("as a hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation, CERCLA
failed to address many important issues"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); Coastal
Casting Service, Inc. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988)(WESTLAW, 1988
WL 35012, at *3)("It is well known that CERCLA was hastily drafted and adopted, with
resulting ambiguities").
13. See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1109; Note, supra note 11, at 1263-64 & nn. 17-18;
Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct on
the Commercial Lending Industry: A CriticalAssessment, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 879, 886
(1987).
14. One court complained that the "courts are once again placed in the undesirable
and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." NEPACCO, 579 F.
Supp. at 839 n.15.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1988).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
18. Secured creditors, like other professedly innocent parties, may invoke the socalled "innocent-landowner defense" to escape Superfund liability. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(35)(A)-(B), 9607(b)(3) (1988). See generally Herbst & Cahalan, Reviewing Liability of Owners, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 15, col. I (discussing the innocent landowner defense). The defense is available to acquirors of property who neither know nor
have reason to know of the presence of hazardous substances on their property.
Although many secured creditors who foreclose on real property could presumably avail
themselves of the defense, they are unlikely to be successful because it has been read so
narrowly. See Comment, supra note 13, at 897-99 & nn.100-10; Herbst & Cahalan,
supra, at 15, col. 1. A discussion of the innocent-landowner defense is outside the scope
of this Note. For such a discussion, see Steinway, The Innocent Landowner Defense: An
Emerging Doctrine, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 486 (1989).
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jects secured creditors to liability for cleaning hazardous waste sites.

9

This has left creditors operating in a risky and uncertain environment.
Consequently, financing for certain environmentally sensitive businesses
threatens to become scarce.
This Note examines CERCLA's secured-creditor exemption, with particular emphasis on the divergent rulings by the Eleventh and Ninth Cir-

cuits in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.2 0 and In re: Bergsoe Metal
Corp.,21 respectively. Part I provides a brief overview of CERCLAI and
its liability scheme and discusses lower court decisions interpreting the
secured creditor exemption. Part II analyzes the Fleet Factorsdecision.
Part III examines the subsequent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Bergsoe
Metal. Part IV proposes that Fleet Factors be limited to its facts, and
recommends that courts adopt a more limited and certain standard for
lender liability than the current "patchwork of conflicting and confused ' 23 decisions interpreting section 101(20)(A). This Note concludes
that federal courts should reject the reasoning of Fleet Factors,but recognizes that Congressional action is ultimately necessary to remedy inconsistent interpretations of the secured-creditor exception.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

CERCLA Overview

Congress enacted CERCLA to address the growing crisis associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites in the United
States.2 4 Congress intended that the Act supplement the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 5 and "plug gaps in the government's then existing anti-pollution program. "26
Although Congress had considered various hazardous waste cleanup
19. Compare United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir.
1990)(narrow interpretation of secured-lender exemption, concluding that ability to influence management precludes application of exemption), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504) with Hill v. East Asiatic Co., (In re
Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990)(creditor must exercise actual
management before falling outside the exemption). For a discussion of lower court interpretations of the exemption, see infra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
20. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S.
Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
21. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
22. This Note does not purport to provide a complete overview of CERCLA. Rather,
this Note discusses only those provisions of CERCLA necessary to an understanding of
the secured-creditor exemption. For more complete discussions of CERCLA, see Grad,
supra note 11; Note, supra note 11, at 1263-74; Comment, supra note 7. at 145-59.
23. Speakers Discuss Environmental LiabilitiesFaced in Making Corporate. Real Estate Deals, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 111, 112 (1990).
24. See H.R Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 6119, 6120.
25. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1988)). RCRA only regulates the operation of hazardous waste facilities. See Note,
supra note 11, at 1263 n.16.
26. United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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bills for several years,27 it did not actually pass one until the waning days
of the Ninety-Sixth Congress. Hurriedly enacting CERCLA in the face
of a new administration,28 Congress left numerous gaps and ambiguities
in the statute.2 9 While the federal judiciary has played an important role
in filling these gaps and defining CERCLA's terms, 30 Congress planted
the seeds for today's inconsistent judicial interpretations by leaving the
statute so ambiguous. 3 '
1. CERCLA's Liability Scheme
While CERCLA fails to specify the nature of the liability it establishes,
courts have construed the statute as establishing strict liability 32 that is
joint and several.33 Congress accepted these determinations in its 1986
amendments to CERCLA.34
The Act imposes liability for cleanup costs on four
groups of statutory
35
persons or so-called potentially responsible parties:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
27. See Grad, supra note 11, at 1.
28. "CERCLA was approved by a lame-duck Congress just prior to the inauguration
of a new administration. The legislation was adopted under a suspension of the rules that
precluded amendments. No conference was held on the measure, and no report was
issued on the statute as enacted." Note, supra note 11, at 1263 n. 17; see also Grad, supra
note 11, at 1 (discussing Congress' rushed effort to draft and pass CERCLA).
29. One court described CERCLA as "a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions." NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp.
823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
30. See Note, supra note 11, at 1263-64. Indeed, this was a result Congress clearly
contemplated: "[i]t is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall
be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law." 126 Cong. Rec.
30,932 (Nov. 24, 1980)(statement of Sen. Randolph, a sponsor of CERCLA); see also
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 528
(1947). ("Statutes . . . at times embody purposeful ambiguity or are expressed with a
generality for future unfolding.").
31. Congress would have done well to heed the advice of Justice Frankfurter: "laws
can measurably be improved with improvement in the mechanics of legislation, and the
need for interpretation is usually in inverse ratio to the care and imagination of draftsmen." Frankfurter, supra note 30, at 528.
32. See J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
33. See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D. Colo. 1985);
NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Comment, supra note 7, at 155.
34. See Comment, supra note 7, at 155 & n.74. The 1986 amendment to CERCLA
was called the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"),
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
35. The Act defines "person" broadly to include an "individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
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[generators of hazardous waste], and
[transporters of hazardous waste].3 6

Because secured creditors have an interest in collateral property, they are
concerned with being liable as owners or operators. The statutory definition of owner or operator, however, provides courts with little
guidance
7
in determining who may be liable as an owner or operator:3
The term 'owner or operator' means ... in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility ....Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or
3s
facility.

This latter 39clause is generally referred to as the "secured-creditor
exemption."

The paucity of legislative history on the scope of the secured-creditor
exemption exacerbates the uncertainty regarding creditors' liability as
owners or operators.' Consequently, courts have had to define the exemption's parameters.
B. Pre-Fleet Factors Construction of the Exemption
Prior to Fleet Factors,few lower courts had considered the scope of the
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). Notice that the Act seems to impose liability
upon current "owner[s] and operator[s]." Compare id. at § 9607(a)(l)(cmphasis added)

with id. at § 9607(a)(2)(imposing liability upon current owners or operators). Courts
have nevertheless construed section 9607(a)(1) disjunctively. See, eg., United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1990)(attributing use of "and" to

inadvertence and therefore construing section in the disjunctive), petitionfor cert.filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504); United States v. Maryland Bank &

Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (D.Md. 1986)(same).
37. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 864 (D.Del. 1989).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
39. See, e.g., Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1556 (calling section 9601(20)(A) the "secured
creditor exemption"). Courts and commentators have used the terms "exception" and
"exemption" interchangeably and they will be so used in this Note.
40. See Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management ParticipationUnder
Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 Yale L.J. 925, 927 (1989). The ambiguity of the
exemption's legislative history is made plain by courts and commentators' seizing upon
parts of the sparse legislative history to justify diametrically opposed results. Compare
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995-96 (E.D. Pa.
1985)(construing legislative history to justify distinction between operational and financial influence exercised by lenders on their borrowers) and Burcat, EnvironmentalLiability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors,and Other Deep Pockets, 103 Banking
L.J. 509, 514 (1986)("the legislative history suggests that the owner or operator must be
...one that is totally responsible for the operation of the facility") with Fleet Factors,901
F.2d at 1558 n. 11 (construing legislative history as requiring a narrow construction of the
exemption). Given the nature of CERCLA's passage, the legislative history must be
viewed with some caution. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp.
1100, 1111-12 (D. Minn. 1982); see also United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S.
295, 320 (1953)(Jackson, J., concurring)("Legislative history here as usual is more vague
than the statute we are called upon to interpret.").
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secured-creditor exemption. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a consensus emerging: banks would not be liable under CERCLA if they
neither had foreclosed upon contaminated property, nor intimately involved themselves in the daily operations of their debtors' businesses.4
Although the liability of creditors who foreclosed upon contaminated
collateral was more uncertain, there was a discernible trend to find those
creditors liable.4 2
The first case43 to consider the scope of the secured-creditor exemption
was United States v. Mirabile. 4 In Mirabile, the creditor-defendants
moved for summary judgment, asserting the security-interest exemption.
The court granted the motions of those creditors not involved in the operational management of the debtor's business, declaring that "the exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor does not
become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of
a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup costs."4 The
Mirabile court found the distinction between operational and financial
involvement by the creditor in its debtor's business to be "critical" 4 6 and
distinguished cases like NEPACCO4" and New York v. Shore Realty
Corp.,48 which involved the liability of corporate officers and shareholders. In distinguishing these cases, the court found significant the share41. "[E]xisting case law suggests that a mortgagee can be held liable under CERCLA
only if the mortgagee participated in the managerial and operational aspects of the facility in question." United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
42. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
43. Before Mirabile, a bankruptcy court had stated in dictum that "even if [the creditor] had repossessed its collateral pursuant to its security agreement it would not be an
'owner or operator' as defined under CERCLA." In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr.
278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); see also Comment, supra note 7, at 161-64 (discussing
T.P. Long case).
44. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). For more detailed
examinations of Mirabile, see Burcat, supra note 40, at 515-20; Note, supra note 11, at
1275-80; Comment, supra note 7, at 165-70.
In Mirabile, the EPA sued Anna and Thomas Mirabile, the current owners of property
that had been cleaned by the EPA, to recover costs incurred in the clean-up. The land
previously had been owned by Turco Coatings, a defunct paint manufacturer. See
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995. The Mirabiles asserted a third-party complaint
against American Bank & Trust ("ABT") and Mellon Bank, both of whom had financed
Turco when the hazardous condition was allegedly created. ABT and Mellon counterclaimed against the United States, which had loaned money to Turco through the Small
Business Administration. See id.
45. Id. at 20995. The court denied Mellon's summary judgment motion because its
predecessor-in-interest was allegedy an active participant in certain operational aspects of
Turco's management. See id. at 20997.
46. Id. at 20995. The Mirabile case has come to be known for this distinction between permissible financial involvement and impermissible operational involvement with
debtors. The court supported its decision by noting that the "reference [in the statute] to
management of the 'facility,' as opposed to management of the affairs of the actual owner
or operator of the facility, suggests once again that the participation which is critical is
participation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities." Id.
47. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
48. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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holders' influence in the "nuts-and-bolts, day-to-day production aspects
of the [polluters'] business[es]," '49 and concluded that the "[m]ere financial ability to control waste disposal practices" was insufficient for the
imposition of liability.50
The next case to consider the exemption was United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company,5 in which the EPA sued Maryland Bank
& Trust ("MBT") to recover approximately $550,000 it had spent to remove waste from a hazardous waste site.52 MBT had foreclosed on the
site and subsequently held title for almost four years.
In examining the secured-creditor exemption, the court found the stat49. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
50. Id.; accord Hill v. East Asiatic Co., (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668,
672 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D.Del.
1989); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. I11.
1988).
But see United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990)
(capacity to influence hazardous waste disposal decisions sufficient to impose liability),
petition for cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3728 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990) (No. 90-504). It is clear
from the court's analysis that the issue of lender liability under CERCLA is a fact-specific
one. This is true of most decisions construing the security-interest exemption. See Mays,
Secured Creditors and Superfund: Avoiding the Liability Net, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 609,
610 (1989); see also EPA Draft ProposalDefining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured CreditorExemption of CERCLA (Sept. 14, 1990)[hereinafter EPA Draft Proposal],
reprintedin 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 668, 671 (1990)(draft of EPA rule clarifying lender
liability establishes a fact-specific inquiry). The EPA draft is currently undergoing interagency review and has not been made public officially; so-called "bootleg" copies of the
proposed rule, however, have been disseminated. See infra note 202.
One of Mirabile'smost striking aspects is its refusal to read the exemption narrowly on
public-policy grounds. See Reed, Fearof Foreclosure. United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10165, 10168 (1986). The Mirabile court
reasoned:
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending institutions
would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given
the fact that owners and operators of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, defunct, or otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that the imposition
of such liability would help to ensure more responsible management of such
sites. The consideration of such policy matters, and the decision as to the imposition of such liability, however, lies with Congress. In enacting CERCLA
Congress singled out secured creditors for protection from liability under certain circumstances.
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20996 (E.D. Pa.
1985). As discussed below, other courts have not followed this approach, as recent, narrower interpretations of the exemption purportedly reflect public-policy concerns. See.
eg., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558-59 (1 th Cir. 1990)(public-policy factors favor narrow interpretation of exemption), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504); United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md. 1986)(same).
51. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). For more detailed discussions of the case, see
Reed, supra note 50, at 10 168-69; Note, supra note 11, at 1280-85; Comment, supra note
7, at 170-76.
52. See Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 575-76. The 117-acre site was owned by the
McLeod family, which had operated a trash disposal business on the site. During the
1970s, MBT had loaned money to Herschel McLeod for this business, during which time
McLeod permitted certain hazardous wastes to be dumped at the site.
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ute's use of the present tense 53 significant because it seemed to indicate
that "[t]he security interest must exist at the time of the clean-up" for the
exemption to apply. 54 Thus, because MBT had full title to the hazardous
waste site during the cleanup, the exemption's protection did not extend
to it. Moreover, the court found that MBT bought the property to protect its investment, 55
rather than its security interest, as required by the
statutory exception.
The court distinguished Mirabile because the foreclosing creditor in
Mirabile had promptly assigned its interest in the property after the foreclosure sale. 56 The MarylandBank court called Mirabile'sreading of the
exemption "generous," declaring that "[t]o the extent to which
[Mirabile] suggests a rule of broader application [of the exemption], this
Court respectfully disagrees." 5 7
In stark contrast to Mirabile, the MarylandBank court relied substantially on public-policy concerns in its decision.
The court stated:
"Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government
alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former
mortgagee-turned-owner, would benefit from the . . . now unpolluted
land."5 9 Because of its disagreement with Mirabile, Maryland Bank &
Trust cast considerable doubt on banks' ability to foreclose upon collateral property without exposing themselves to potential CERCLA liability if the property was in fact contaminated.
The last relevant district court decision' prior to Fleet Factors was
53. See 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A) (1988).
54. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
55. See id. at 579-80. This is an unrealistic and unduly narrow conception of the
necessities of secured lending. Lenders often have no choice but to bid for collateral at
foreclosure sales. See EPA Draft Proposal,supra note 50, at 670; Tupi, Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating: Expanded CERCLA Liability for ForeclosingLenders, 4 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 844, 846 & n.28 (1989).
56. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579 & n.5. In Mirabile, the creditor foreclosed
on the contaminated property and was the high bidder at a subsequent sheriff's sale, but
held the property for only four months until it assigned its bid. See United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20996 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
57. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
58. See id. at 579-80.
59. Id. at 580. This fear may be misplaced. Even with an EPA-financed cleanup of
collateral property, "it is more likely that the bank will actually lose money on the site."
Burcat, Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper
or Learning to Dance to a New Tune?, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098, 10100
(1987). After legal expenses, administrative costs, forgone interest, and the diminution in
value of once-contaminated property, it is not likely that a bank could do any better than
break even. See id.
60. Coastal Casting Service v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8,
1988)(WESTLAW, 1988 WL 35012), had also considered the secured-creditor exemption. Citing Mirabile favorably and construing the exemption broadly, the court declared
that secured creditors are liable only "when active participation and exercise of control
over essential operations of the site's facility bring that party within the statutory definition of owner or operator." Id. at *4.
Nevertheless, CoastalCasting has not been an influential case. First, the motion before
the court was a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
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6
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating& Manufacturing Co. 1
In considering the liability of a creditor that had foreclosed upon contaminated collateral, the Guidice court segmented its analysis into two
time frames: the period before the bank purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale and the period when the bank held title to the site. As to
the former, the court adopted the financial-operational distinction
promulgated by Mirabile.62 Although the bank had carefully monitored
its debtor and exercised some financial influence over the company, the
court found "no evidence suggesting that the Bank controlled operational, production, or waste disposal activities at the [debtor's]
[p]roperty. ' '63 In fact, the Guidice court viewed the actions of the bank
prior to foreclosure as "prudent measures undertaken to protect its seThe court justified imposition of "a high liability
curity interest."'

(b)(6). For the purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true the plaintiff's
allegations, see C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d, § 1357, at 304
(1990), and not surprisingly, the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant bank had exercised operational control over its debtor. See Coastal Casting Corp. v. Aron, No. H-864463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988)(WESTLAW, 1988 WL 35012, at *4). The court's discussion of the parameters of the statutory exemption was, therefore, quite limited. Second,
the case was not published and consequently has not enjoyed wide readership.
61. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). The facts of the case are as follows: during
the 1970s, Berlin Metal Polishers, owned and managed by the Runco family, operated a
metal-polishing business in Pennsylvania ("Berlin site"). See id. at 558. Beginning in
1971, the National Bank of the Commonwealth (the "Bank") financed Berlin Metal. In
September 1975, the Bank approved a loan to the company to construct a new treatment
facility to satisfy certain environmental requirements of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("PaDER"). See id. The loan was secured by a mortgage on
the Berlin site. Berlin Metal defaulted on this loan in early 1980. In June 1981, the Bank
foreclosed on its mortgage and in April 1982 the Bank was the high bidder for the property at the sheriff's sale, and held title to the site until January 1983 when it conveyed the
property to a trust created by the former owners. See id. at 558-59.
In October 1986, residents of the Borough of Punxsutawney commenced an action
against BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Company, alleging that the company had
contaminated the environment and caused certain personal injuries. The residents also
asserted a claim for response costs under CERCLA to clean certain contaminated property. BFG in turn asserted a third-party complaint against current and past owners of
the Berlin site (which was adjacent to BFG's property), seeking indemnification, contribution and response costs. The Bank moved for summary judgment. See id. at 558.
The case is rather ironic insofar as the Bank might incur liability arising out of a loan
originally extended to facilitate compliance with environmental regulations. See generally Statement of the American Bankers Association on the Lender Liability Act of 1990
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,
July 19, 1990 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafterABA Statement], at 1-2
(reluctance to lend "will reduce the capital available to businesses which want to protect
or restore the condition of the environment"). For a more extended discussion of
Guidice, see Tupi, supra note 55.
62. See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561. The court both cited and quoted Mirabile. See
id.
63. Id. at 562. The court's language is identical to that used in Mirabile: "The reference [in the statute] to management of the 'facility,' . . . suggests once again that the
participation which is critical is participation in operational,production, or waste disposal
activities." United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995
(E.D. Pa. 1985)(emphasis added).
64. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562.
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threshold" 65 on policy grounds, believing that a higher threshold would
encourage creditors to monitor their debtors' use of collateral carefully,
and thereby "enhance the dual purposes of protection of the banks' investments and promoting CERCLA's policy goals." 6 6
In analyzing the bank's liability for activities after it foreclosed and
took title to the facility, however, the Guidice court noted the divergence
between Mirabile and MarylandBank & Trust. The court found support
for Maryland Bank & Trust's narrow reading of the exemption in the
enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA").6 7 The court also found persuasive "the concern expressed in
Maryland Bank & Trust, that an exemption for landowning lenders
would create a special class of otherwise liable landowners. ' 68
In sum, Guidice strengthened the view first advanced in Mirabile that
creditors could involve themselves in their debtors' financial decisions
without exposing themselves to CERCLA liablity. This approach
seemed consistent with the exemption's language referring to participation in the management of a facility, as opposed to management of the
debtor. Nonetheless, by embracing Maryland Bank's analysis of postforeclosure liability, Guidice also cast considerable doubt on creditors'
ability to foreclose on collateral property without exposing themselves to
cleanup liability.
II.

UNITED STATES V. FLEET FACTORS CORP.

A. Facts of the Case

Swainesboro Print Works ("SPW") operated a cloth-printing facility
65. Id. at 562 & n.1.
66. Id. at 562.
67. See id. at 563. SARA amended CERCLA to exclude from liability state and local
governments that acquire title to properties involuntarily, as when the property is abandoned or acquired because of tax delinquency. See id. According to the court, the fact
that Congress did not also amend CERCLA to exclude from liability lenders that acquire
property through foreclosure supports the inference that Congress intended to hold lenders liable as owners. See id.
This reasoning is unsound. If Congress believed it had already exempted lenders from
such liability, then it would be unnecessary to amend CERCLA. Thus, the court's interpretation begs the question of what Congress meant when it included an exemption for
secured creditors in CERCLA. It should also be noted that the Maryland Bank & Trust
decision, which indeed might have given Congress reason to exempt landowning lenders
specifically, was decided after the substantive markup of SARA had been completed. See
Note, supra note 11, at 1293 n.176.
68. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563. One critical distinction between Guidice and Maryland Bank & Trust may make the court's reliance on the latter misplaced. See Tupi,
supra note 55, at 845-46. In Maryland Bank & Trust, the court was concerned about the
creditor reaping a windfall at the government's expense by waiting for the government to
clean-up the foreclosed-upon property and then sell it at a profit. See United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986). The Bank in Guidice,
however, had sold the Berlin property at a loss more than two years before the EPA
began remedial efforts at the site. See Tupi, supra note 55, at 846.
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in Georgia from 1963 to February 1981, when it ceased operations. 69
SPW and Fleet Factors, a factoring 70 subsidiary of Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, entered into an agreement in 1976, pursuant to which Fleet
lent money to SPW and SPW assigned its accounts receivable to Fleet.
In consideration for extending credit to SPW, Fleet Factors also took a
security interest in SPW's property, plant, equipment, fixtures and inventory. In February 1981, SPW ceased operating and in December 1981
was adjudicated a bankrupt under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.7 '
The bankruptcy court subsequently appointed a trustee to liquidate
SPW's estate.
Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in certain inventory and equipment in May 1982.72 It did not, however, foreclose on its security interest in the plant or real property. Between June 1982 and December
1983, Fleet contracted with third parties to auction and remove the
equipment from SPW's facilities. In so doing, these third parties allegedly disturbed asbestos that had been sprayed on pipes connected to the
equipment.
The EPA subsequently inspected the site in January 1984, discovering
approximately 700 fifty-five-gallon drums that contained hazardous substances.13 After concluding that asbestos at the site endangered the public health and the environment, the EPA removed forty-four truckloads
of asbestos-containing material, as well as the drums containing toxic
substances. On July 7, 1987, title to the facility passed to Emanuel
County, Georgia at a foreclosure sale resulting from SPW's tax delinquency. Two days later, the EPA brought an action against Fleet Factors to recover approximately $400,000 spent for the cleanup of the SPW
facility. 4 Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of
Fleet's liability.
Following the precedent established in Mirabile, the district court:
interpret[ed] the phrases 'participating in the management of a...
facility' and 'primarilyto protect his security interest,' to permit secured creditors to provide financial assistance and general, and even
69. The facts of the case are detailed in the district court's opinion. See United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 957-59 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550
(1Ith Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990) (No. 90504).
70. Factoring is a "type of financial service whereby a firm sells or transfers title to its
accounts receivable to a factoring company, which then acts as principal, not as agent.
The receivables are sold without recourse, meaning that the factor cannot turn to the
seller in the event accounts prove uncollectible." J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary
of Finance and Investment Terms 122 (1985).
71. SPW had originally filed under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code but subsequently converted the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1988).
72. See Fleet Factors,724 F. Supp. at 958.
73. See id. at 959.
74. See id. at 957-59. The EPA could not bring an action against Emanuel County
because SARA amended CERCLA to exempt from liability states and their political subdivisions that acquire title to contaminated property pursuant to foreclosure for nonpayment of taxes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
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isolated instances of specific, management advice to its debtors without
risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor does not participate
in the day-to-day management of the business or facility either before
or after the business ceases operation. 75
Applying this standard to the period of time before Fleet's representative
auctioned the foreclosed-upon equipment, the court held that Fleet's limited participation in the management of the facility would entitle it to
claim the secured-creditor exemption.
As to the period of time from the auction until Fleet ceased to have
any contact with the SPW property, however, the court found that there
were material disputed facts regarding "the condition of the chemicals
and asbestos in the facility."' 76 It therefore denied this part of Fleet's
summary judgment motion. In addition, Judge Cowen certified an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte, noting that there existed "substantial doubt" about the proper construction of CERCLA's
definition of "owner and operator" and of the secured-creditor
exemption.77
Overall, the court's decision was well received by commentators 78 and
with Mirabile and other lower court decisions
construed as consistent
79
that had preceded it.
B.

The Eleventh Circuit Rules: A Lender's Nightmare

After discussing CERCLA's liability scheme, the circuit panel 8" discussed Fleet's liability under section 9607(a)(2). 8' The court ostensibly
75. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988)).
76. 724 F. Supp. at 961.
77. See id. at 962. One might wonder how businessmen are to conduct their affairs so
as to minimize their potential CERCLA liability when judges, whose function it is to
interpret statutes, cannot make sense of certain crucial statutory provisions. See generally Dizard, Toxic Loans, Corp. Fin., Sept. 1990, at 43, 36-43 (discussing uncertainties
caused by the "huge, unquantifiable, and expanding cost of environmental liabilities").
78. See, e.g., Mays, supra note 50, at 612 (calling the case "helpful").
79. In United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989), a case
decided five months after Fleet Factors,Judge Broderick declared that "existing case law
suggests that a mortgagee can be held liable under CERCLA only if the mortgagee participated in the managerial and operational aspects of the facility in question."
80. The case was heard by Judges Vance and Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit and
Judge Lynne, a Senior District Judge sitting by designation. See United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504). Judge Vance did not participate in the decision
due to his death in December 1989, so the case was decided by a quorum consisting of
only one member of the Eleventh Circuit. One commentator has suggested that these
"[p]ractical circumstances ... could affect the strength of the holding." O'Brien, The
'Fleet Factors' Decision: Its Effect on Secured Lending, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 23, 25
n.1 (1990).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). Before commencing a discussion of Fleet's
liability under 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a)(2), the court affirmed the district court's holding
that Fleet could not be liable under section 9607(a)(1), which imposes liability on current
owners or operators. 901 F.2d at 1555.
This section is modified by section 9601(20)(A)(iii), which defines owner or operator to
mean "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
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framed the issue as other courts had, stating that "[t]he critical issue is
whether Fleet participated in management sufficiently to incur liability
under the statute."8 2 Fleet Factors'ssimilarity to other courts' decisions,
however, ended at this point.
In essence, the court recognized a new class of liable parties under
CERCLA. 83 It stated:
[there are] two distinct, but related, means of finding Fleet liable under
§ 9607(a)(2). First, Fleet is liable under the statute if it operated the
facility within the meaning of the statute. Alternatively, Fleet can be
held liable if it had an indicia of ownership in SPW and managed the
facility to the extent necessary to remove it from the secured creditor
liability exemption.... In order to avoid repetition, and because this
case fits more snugly under a secured creditor
84 analysis, we will forgo an

analysis of Fleet's liability as an operator.
Thus, rather than limit its analysis to operator liability, for which authority exists and pursuant to which Fleet would admittedly be liable, 85 the
court enunciated a radical new standard86 for determining lender liability
under CERCLA.
The government had urged the court to find the secured-creditor exception inapplicable if the creditor "participates in any manner in the
management of the facility." 8 7 Fleet, in contrast, suggested that the
immediately" before it is involuntarily acquired by a state or political subdivision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988). In Fleet Factors, the government had urged the
court to construe this section "to refer liability 'back to the last time that someone controlled the facility, however long ago.'" Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 23). In this way, the EPA had hoped that the court would ignore the
bankruptcy trustee's ownership of the facility after Fleet ceased to have any contact with
the property and before Emanuel County foreclosed. The extremity of this position
makes all the more remarkable the EPA's sudden policy change in August 1990 when it
bowed to Congressional pressure and agreed to promulgate a rule to exempt secured
creditors from CERCLA liability explicitly. For a discussion of EPA's reversal on the
issue of lender liability, see infra note 202.
82. 901 F.2d at 1556 (footnote omitted). While subtle, the court's syntax unmasks its
approach to the issue. The court viewed the question as whether participation in management was sufficient to impose liability. More precisely, the issue is whether Fleet's
participation in management was sufficient to remove it from the exception to liability.
See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa.
1989)(holding certain "activities prior to foreclosure insufficient to void the security interest exemption")(emphasis added). The court extended this syntactical error to its logical
extreme by using the exception to carve out a new class of potentially responsible parties
under CERCLA. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
83. See Koegel, Bank Power DrawsSuperfund Liability, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1990, at 1,
col. 1; O'Brien, supra note 80, at 24.
84. 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
85. The court admitted that Fleet would be liable as an operator but nevertheless
eschewed an analysis of operator liability. See id.
86. See, eg., Connolly, Superfund Whacks the Banks, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1990, at
All, col. 3 ("ruling drastically expands 'lender liability' under [CERCLA]"); Dizard,
supra note 77, at 40, col. I (calling Fleet Factors the "antitank mine of open-ended environmental liability"); Koegel, supra note 83, at 1, col. I (court "created a fifth category of
responsible parties under CERCLA").
87. FleetFactors, 901 F.2d at 1556; see also Brief for United States as Appellee at 40-
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court adopt "the distinction delineated by some district courts between
permissible participation in the financial management of the facility and
impermissible participation in the day-to-day or operational management
of a facility."8 8 After reviewing the district court decisions adopting the
latter approach (including that of the court below), the court rejected
both in favor of what it viewed as an intermediate approach.89
The court attempted to give meaning to its new standard:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability ...

by participating in the financial manage-

ment of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for
the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable .... Rather, a secured creditor
will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference 90that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.
The court rejected contentions that this standard might lead to perverse incentives for lenders, such as inducing them to monitor their borrowers less carefully. Instead, it believed that the opposite result would
ensue, and justified its ruling as "encourag[ing] [lenders] to monitor the
hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist[ing] upon compliance with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future financial support."'" The court
construed its holding as providing "a strong incentive [to creditors] to
address hazardous waste problems at the facility rather than studiously
avoiding the investigation and amelioration of the hazard."9 2
C.

Fleet Factors: Statutory Construction Gone Wrong

93
The reaction to Fleet Factors was swift and overwhelmingly negative.

43, Fleet Factors (No. 89-8094)(urging court to interpret exemption as unavailable when
creditor participates in any manner in management of a facility).
88. 901 F.2d at 1556.
89. See id. at 1556-58. The court's approach is only intermediate when juxtaposed
with the government's untenably narrow construction of the exception and the various
lower courts' more reasonable construction of the exception. In absolute terms, the
court's interpretation of the exemption is quite narrow, thereby expanding liability more
than any previous construction. See Connolly, supra note 86, at A 1l, col. 3; Leland,
Lender Liability in Cleanups Presents Workout Dilemma, Am. Banker, June 20, 1990, at
4, col. 1; Wojcik & Adler, Ruling May Widen Lenders'Liability,Bus. Ins., June 4, 1990,
at 1.
90. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (footnotes omitted),
petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
91. Id. at 1558 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 1559.
93. See Berz & Gillon, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep
Pocket, 108 Banking L.J. 4 (1991); see also, Brodsky, Lender Liabilityfor Environmental
Cleanup, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (decision "counterproductive"); Connolly,
supra note 86, at A11, cols. 3-5 (calling the court "naive" and the standard it establishes
an "absurdity"); Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under
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Commentators criticized the decision on numerous grounds: it was not
supported by the statute or precedent; it created a new class of potentially responsible parties, thereby turning the exception on its head; and,
insofar as the decision purported to be policy-oriented, its policy formulation was misguided, shortsighted and counterproductive. These criticisms are considered in turn.9 4
1. Statutory and Precedential Support
The Fleet Factors court did not explicitly identify the nature of its
analysis, 95
although it did suggest that it examined Fleet's liability as an
"owner."
Whether the court considered its analysis as one of ownership liability or secured-creditor liability9 6 is unimportant, however, because the standard it applies was unprecedented regardless of its label.
Despite the liberal construction afforded CERCLA's liability provisions, the plain meaning of the word "owner" counsels against its definitional extension9 7 to an independent third party whose only indicium of
ownership in the polluter is a security interest.9" Indeed, Judge Easterbrook, cautioning against "pursu[ing] [CERCLA's and SARA's] ends to
their logical limits,"9 9 has urged that the statutes' terms be accorded
their ordinary meanings:
Superfund, Nat'l L.., Sept. 17, 1990, at 19, cols. 1-2 ("ironic" ruling has "troubling
aspects"); Koegel, supra note 83, at 1, col. I (criticizing decision); Leland, supra note 89,
at 4, cols. 2-3 ("portentous" decision that "improperly expanded the circumstances under
which a lender that does not foreclose can be found [liable]"); O'Brien, supra note 80, at
25 (decision "out of the mainstream of the law"); Speakers Discuss EnvironmentalLiabilities Faced in Making Corporate, Real Estate Deals, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 111, 112
(Fleet Factors "'raised the alarm to almost a fever pitch among the lending community' ")(quoting an environmental attorney).
94. Fleet Factors makes many of these same arguments in its petition for certiorari.
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, Fleet Factors Corp. v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21,
1990)(No. 90-504)[hereinafter Fleet CertiorariPetition](expanding liability would disrupt
commercial practices and cause concern for lending and business community).
95. The court expressly resisted analyzing Fleet's liability as an operator, although
the government had alleged facts sufficient to give rise to such liability. See 901 F.2d at
1556 n.6. Nevertheless, the court's language in various parts of the opinion indicates that
its analysis is one of ownership liability. See, e.g., id. at 1557 ("Had Congress intended to
absolve secured creditors from ownership liability, it would have done so.")(emphasis added). Unfortunately, however, the court's linguistic imprecision is confusing in this regard. See, e.g., id. at 1556 n.6 (calling its examination of Fleet's liability "a secured
creditoranalysis")(emphasisadded).
96. See id at 1556 n.6 (calling its inquiry "a secured creditor analysis").
97. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1988); see also Frankfurter, supra note 30, at 536 ("we assume that Congress uses
common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men").
98. Quite distinguishable from the creditor that does not foreclose upon its security
interest in a facility-Fleet Factors, for example-is the creditor that not only forecloses
but also purchases the property at the foreclosure sale and holds it for almost four years.
This creditor is plainly an "owner" within the ordinary meaning of the term. See United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
99. Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 156.
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§ 9601(20)(A)(ii) informs us that "[t]he term . . . 'owner or operator'
means... in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any
person owning or operating such facility". This is circular, although it
does imply that if [a person] is neither "onshore" nor "offshore"perhaps because in outer space?-then an owner or operator is not a
statutory "owner or operator". The definition of "owner or operator"
for purposes of earthbound sites must come from a source other than
the text. The circularity strongly implies, however, that the statutory
terms have their ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical
meanings.10°

Clearly, as was the case in Fleet Factors, a secured creditor holding an
unforeclosed-upon lien on a facility 0 1 is not an "owner" of the facility
within the ordinary meaning of that term.
Nor has such a creditor been construed an owner under section
9607(a)(2).1 °2 In fact, most cases under section 9607(a)(2) have only
construed the term "operator," probably because its meaning is ambiguous. The few cases holding owners liable involve either a parent corporation's liability for its subsidiary or a stockholder's liability for corporate
waste-disposal practices.10 3 These cases are distinguishable from Fleet
Factors and other lender liability cases."
Not finding any textual support for its position, then, the Fleet Factors
court supported its novel construction of the secured creditor exception
with three sources: (1) the " 'overwhelmingly remedial' goal of the
CERCLA statutory scheme;"' 5 (2) United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp.;"°6 and (3) remarks made by Representative Harsha upon "introduc[ing] the exemption to the bill that was finally passed [as CERCLA]. ' 1 °7 For the reasons enunciated below, the court's reliance on
these sources for support is misplaced.
100. Id. at 156 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988)).
101. Recall that Fleet Factors foreclosed upon equipment (personal property) and not
upon SPW's facility or real property. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 955, 958 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.
filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
102. A thorough review of the cases and the literature has failed to identify any case
holding a secured creditor who had not foreclosed upon its lien on a facility liable as an
owner. For a discussion of earlier decisions examining lender liability under CERCLA,
see supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986)(individual shareholder
liable where active in management), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985)(same); United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.R.I. 1989)(parent corporation liable for cleanup of its
subsidiary's waste), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W.
3407 (No. 90-816) (U.S. Nov. 23, 1990).
104. See Freeman, supra note 93, at 19, col 1.; see also infra notes 112-124 and accompanying text (discussing Kayser-Roth).
105. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
106. See id. at 1556 & n.6 (citing United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15,
20-21 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1990) (No. 90-816)).
107. Id. at 1558 n.11.
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a. CERCLA's Ends to Defeat Its Terms
While a statute's overall objective necessarily colors its interpretation
and is a valid starting point for construction, it is not an end to be slavishly pursued by courts regardless of the actual terms of the statute:
To the point that courts could achieve "more" of the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond
that statutes have not only ends but also limits. Born of compromise,
laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their
logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no
less than to implement other legislative choices.10 8
Thus, recognizing CERCLA's remedial goal does not mean that any
available deep pocket-here a secured lender-was intended to shoulder
liability for someone else's environmental misdeeds." ° In short, CERCLA's "'overwhelmingly remedial' goal" "o does not support the sweeping extension of liability that the Fleet Factors court imposed. t '
b.

ShareholderLiability Cases: Misplaced Support

The Fleet Factorscourt also cited UnitedStates v. Kayser-Roth Corp.112
to support its contention that secured lenders are liable under CERCLA
when they hold a security interest and participate in management to
some lesser degree than is necessary for imposing operator liability." '
Kayser-Roth's facts, however, are simply too different to provide a precedent for the court's construction of the secured-creditor exception. First,
Kayser-Roth did not consider CERCLA's security-interest exception.
The case dealt with the liability of a parent corporation for its wholly
108. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.
1988) (citation omitted); see also F.B.I. v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 633 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)("Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making
might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. [The
judge] must not read in by way of creation.")(quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 533 (1947)); United States v. New Castle
County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 864-65 (D. Del. 1989)(limitations must have been contemplated for CERCLA).
109. Cf Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 157 (not the courts' role in enforcing statutory
objectives to fashion liability where the statute does not fix it); New Castle County, 727 F.
Supp. at 864-65 (while CERCLA has been construed liberally to accomplish its goals, it
must have some limits). One of CERCLA's original sponsors has declared that Congress
"never intended to impose liability on such lenders." See Letter from Representative
LaFalce to Members of the House of Representatives (Aug. 3, 1990)(discussing H.R.
4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990))(on file with the Fordham Law Review).
110. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
111. Cf 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th
Cir. 1990)("We agree that the Act is to be given a broad interpretation to accomplish its
remedial goals. However we must reject a construction that the statute on its face does
not permit, and the legislative history does not support.")(citations omitted).
112. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert
filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1990) (No. 90-816).
113. See 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6.
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owned subsidiary.' 14 Furthermore, the Kayser-Roth court examined the
parent's liability as an operator" 5 and as an owner, 116 but not under the
novel "secured creditor analysis" advanced by the Fleet Factors court. 7
Consequently, Kayser-Roth cannot provide support for such a theory.
Finally, the parent corporation in Kayser-Roth had "exerted practical total influence and control over [the subsidiary's] operations." ' 8 Such pervasive control, however, is not necessary to impose liability under the
Fleet Factors standard.' 19
In addition, the language in Kayser-Roth that allegedly supports Fleet
Factors' narrow construction of the exemption is inapposite. This language appears in a discussion of "two slightly different approaches"
taken by the federal courts to finding that a "parent corporation was a de
facto operator of [its] subsidiary."' 20 The first approach focuses on
stockholder's control of the polluter when determining liability. The
other focuses on ownership plus participation in management. KayserRoth derives support for the latter approach from section 101(20)(A),
"[rleasoning that this exception implies that a person who holds indicia
of a corporation's ownership
and who participates in its management can
12 1
be an owner or operator."'
Kayser-Roth's reference to this line of cases, however, is of little precedential value to the Fleet Factors court. First, the line of cases to which
Kayser-Roth refers are analyzed under an operator theory of liability, not
the lower threshold of liability proposed in Fleet Factors.'2 2 Second, the
114. See Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 17. The parent-subsidiary relationship is generally much closer than that of lender and borrower. Indeed, Kayser-Roth had exercised
total control over its subsidiary. See id. at 18.
115. See id. at 22.
116. See id. at 23. The Kayser-Roth court's analysis of ownership liability is substantially influenced by the parent corporation's "overwhelming pervasive control" over its
subsidiary. Id. at 24. The case was more properly considered under an analysis of operator liability as demonstrated by the First Circuit's affirming opinion. See United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1990)(affirming on the grounds that the
parent corporation was liable as an operator), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3407
(U.S. Nov. 23, 1990) (No. 90-816). The appellate court, therefore, did not reach the issue
of Kayser-Roth's liability as an owner. See id. at 28 n.11.
117. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
118. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) petitionfor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1990) (No.
90-816).
119. See Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557-58.
120. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 20.
121. Id. at 20. This reasoning may be valid in the context of disregarding the corporate form in order to impose liability upon shareholders that control polluters. The exemption is intended "to prevent the establishment of 'dummy' corporations, with few
assets, which would be the responsible party for the purpose of the act." 2 Senate Comm.
on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 2 A Legislative
History of the CERCLA of 1980 945 (Comm. Print 1983)(remarks of Representative
Harsha upon introducing the exemption); see also infra notes 125-131 and accompanying
text (discussing Representative Harsha's comments and the purpose of the exemption).
122. See Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 20.
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parties in these cases are equity owners, 123 not secured creditors who
could plausibly have asserted the secured-creditor exemption. Finally,
24
Kayser-Roth did not apply this line of analysis to the case before it.'
The language cited by Fleet Factors, therefore, is merely dictum.

c. Reading the Legislative History Out of Context
In support of its admittedly narrow construction of the secured-creditor exemption, the Fleet Factors court quoted comments by Representative Harsha, who had introduced the exemption:
This change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently
subjected those who hold title to a ... facility, but do not participate in
the management or operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the
person leasing
or operating the ... facility, to the liability provisions of
12 5
the bill.

The court interpreted Representative Harsha's "use of the word 'affiliated' to describe the threshold at which a secured creditor becomes liable
[as] clearly indicat[ing] a more peripheral degree of involvement with the
affairs of a facility than that necessary to be held liable as an operator." 126 The court exaggerates the significance of Representative Har-

sha's comments, however.127 First, the comments were made in the
context of introducing an exception to liability, not establishing a new
class of liable parties. 28 Moreover, when considered in the context of his
entire statement, it is clear that Representative Harsha's comments did
not contemplate lender liability.' 29 Rather, he addressed the tension cre123. See id. at 20 (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d
Cir. 1985) and NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)); see. e.g.,
NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744 (individual shareholder liable as operator); Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1052 (same)).
124. See Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 22-24.
125. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.l1 (lth Cir.
1990)(quoting Remarks of Representative Harsha, 2 Senate Comm. on Environmental
and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 2 A Legislative History of the CERCLA of 1980 945 (Comm. Print 1983)(emphasis added)), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
126. Id.
127. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111-12 (D.
Minn. 1982); see also Frankfurter, supra note 30, at 543 (" 'It is a delicate business to base
speculations about the purposes or construction of a statute upon the vicissitudes of its
passage.' ")(quoting Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922)

(Holmes, J.)).
128. For a discussion of the analytical problems of the court's use of the exception to
create a new class of liable parties, see infra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
129. Had the Fleet Factorscourt continued the language they quote, the passage would
read more accurately, while providing less support:
This change was necessary because the original definition inadvertently subjected those who hold title to a vessel or facility, but do not participate in the
management or operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the vessel or facility, to the liability provisions of the bill.
While the Merchant Marine Committee report indicated this situation was
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ated by providing an exemption from liability for innocent lessors and
charterers
while not allowing corporate form to shield polluters from
130
liability.
Second, it is not clear that this ambiguous comment has any real significance. One commentator took the court to task for placing such
weight on this obscure part of CERCLA's legislative history:
But what does "otherwise affiliated" mean in this context? It seems
more likely that the phrase is really a few "throw away" words by a
congressman who did not expect to be cited for statutory construction.
Such an obscure expression provides flimsy support for turning an exemption for secured
creditors into a liability more pervasive than that
13 1
facing operators.
In conclusion, Fleet Factors should have offered more credible statutory and precedential support for its radical departure from existing case
law.
2.

The Exception Swallowing the Rule

Perhaps the most serious flaw in the court's opinion is its manipulation
of the language of the secured-creditor exemption to create what constitutes a new class of liable parties. The secured-creditor exception is just
not intended the statutory language is unclear. Therefore, I offered clarifying
language to truly exempt those who hold title but do not participate in the
operation or management activities. My amendment also requires that those
that hold title cannot be affiliated in any way with those who lease or charter
the vessel or facility. This was done to prevent the establishment of "dummy"
corporations,with few assets, which would be the responsiblepartyfor the purpose
of the act.
2 Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
2 A Legislative History of the CERCLA of 1980 945 (Comm. Print 1983)(remarks of
Representative Harsha)(emphasis added). The italicized language reveals that Representative Harsha's comments were directed toward the tension created by an exemption that
attempts to exempt bona fide third parties unaffiliated with the polluter, while disregarding the corporate form to establish CERCLA liability.
130. Indeed, the courts have looked beyond the corporate form to hold shareholders
liable under CERCLA. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986)(holding individual shareholder liable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985)(same); United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 24 (D.R.I. 1989)(holding parent corporation liable for cleanup of
subsidiary's waste), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W.
3407 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1990) (90-816). See generally Billauer, Directorsand Officers Facing
New Troubles in LiabilityArena, Nat'l L.J., May 1, 1989, at 22, col. 1 (discussing liability
of corporate officers for corporation's waste disposal practices); DeWitt & Denton, Personal Liability Under CERCLA for Corporate Officers and Directors, 5 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 375 (1990)(same); Black & Leveille, The CorporateVeil and CERCLA Liability, 4
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 871 (1990)(discussing the corporate form and CERCLA liability).
131. Koegel, supra note 83, at 1, col. 1. It is indeed a bit ironic that the court deemphasized CERCLA's actual language because of its hasty passage and poor drafting, see
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1990), petition
for cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3728 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504), while according great
weight to the use of a particular word like "affiliated" in the legislative history. See id. at
1558 n.11.
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that, an exception 132 to liability. Fleet Factors' analysis.. would not
only eviscerate the exception, 134 but would also establish an independent,
substantive basis for imposing CERCLA liability. 31
Essentially, the court has inverted the exception, seizing on its language to justify the creation of a new class of liable parties-a class that
is not contemplated by the statutory sections that enumerate and define
the universe of potentially responsible parties. The result of this distortion is as ironic as it is perverse:' 36 Congress affirmatively excepted secured creditors from some degree of CERCLA liability, but the Fleet
Factors court has used Congress' implementing language to justify expanding lender liability.
3. Policy Considerations: A Narrow Approach
Aside from obvious shortcomings in statutory construction, the Fleet
Factorsdecision does a poor job of fashioning policy. The court was motivated by a desire to make lenders behave as environmental police. 13 In
establishing such a vague standard for liability, however, the court has
created a situation that could paralyze secured lending to certain businesses.1 38 Moreover, the court's standard will not only fail to achieve its
own policy goals, 139 but will frustrate other legitimate public policies

should it become the rule.
a.

Fleet Factors' Vague Standard: A Catch-22 for Lenders

Congress' desire to encourage and foster small business" 4 will be particularly undercut. Fleet Factors creates an amorphous liability stan132. Exception is variously defined as "an excluding, as from ...a description; ...that
which is... separated from others in a general description;... a case to which a rule,
general principle, etc. does not apply." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary
636 (2d ed. 1968).
133. "Fleet can be held liable if it had an indicia of ownership in SPW and managed
the facility to the extent necessary to remove it from the secured creditor liability exemption." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6 (citation omitted).
134. See Connolly, supra note 86, at All, cols. 3-5; Wojcik & Adler, supra note 89, at
1; infra note 151 and accompanying text.
135. See Koegel, supra note 83, at 1, col. I; O'Brien, supra note 80, at 25. The court
even seems to acknowledge that it is creating a "secured creditor analysis" for establishing CERCLA liability. See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6. Yet CERCLA only
imposes liability under section 107(a)(2) upon "any person who... owned or operated
any facility .... See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). The reference to liability for owners
or operators appears in other sections of CERCLA as well, including, significantly, the
definitional section of the statute. See id. at § 9601(20)(A); id. at § 9607(a)(1).
136. See Freeman, supra note 93, at 19, cols. 1-2; Dizard, supra note 77, at 36, 41.
137. See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558-59 & n.12.
138. See Dizard, supra note 77, at 36; Hamilton, Passing the Buck on Toxic Cleanup,
Wash. Post, July 6, 1990, at Cl, col. 1.
139. For example, lenders are likely to be less involved with their borrowers. See
Brodsky, supra note 93, at 5, col. 2; Connolly, supra note 86, at A 1,cols. 4-5; Freeman,
supra note 93, at 20, cols. 2-3.
140. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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dard 4 that is triggered by an "inference that [the creditor] could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."' 14 2 Not only does this
standard fail to inform creditors of the extent to which they can protect

their security interests, but it bases liability upon conjecture.' 4 3 The
vagueness of the Fleet Factors test is exacerbated by its reliance on hypothetical inquiry. Now, rather than asking themselves "Have I influenced
the operational management of the polluter?"'--a question lenders
should presumably be able to answer with some degree of certaintybankers must ask themselves "Have I involved myself in management to
the extent that I could influence hazardous waste decisions, even though
I have never attempted to exercise such influence?" The latter inquiry is
fraught with uncertainty.
The court's efforts to clarify its nebulous standard are unavailing. In
an apparent attempt to mollify creditors, the court declared that "a secured creditor can become involved in occasional and discrete financial
decisions relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring liability."' 4 5 Nevertheless, the court failed to explain how often, to
what extent, and in what kinds of occasional and discreet financial transactions creditors may involve themselves without incurring liability.

The unfairness of such a vague standard is manifest, but the inequity is
in fact much more acute because of the dilemma it creates for secured
creditors. The court believed its construction of the secured-creditor exemption would "encourage [lenders] to ...insist upon compliance with
acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future
financial support."14' 6 Whether this insistence should be in general or
141. See Connolly, supra note 86, at All, cols. 3-5; Koegel, supra note 83, at 1,col. 1;
Pollard & Greco, Congress Must Correct Superfund Law, Am. Banker, July 25, 1990, at

4, col. 1.
142. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (1lth Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990) (No. 90-504).
143. See Herbst & Cahalan, supra note 18, at 17.
144. Several lower court decisions, including the district court in Fleet Factors, distinguished financial and operational influence for establishing lender liability under CERCLA. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62
(W.D. Pa. 1989)(creditor not liable where it does not participate in operational management of facility)(citing United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20994, 20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955,
960 (S.D. Ga. 1988)(no CERCLA liability if creditor "does not participate in the day-today management of the business or facility"); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985)(same).
145. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.

146. Id. (citations omitted). As a matter of fact, such insistence, at least in the abstract, is something that prudent lenders would undertake regardless of their own liability. See, e.g., H. Chaitman, The Law of Lender Liability 9.02(7)(b) (1990)(urging that
lenders insist upon representations and warranties from borrowers that it will comply
with environmental regulations); J. Moskowitz, Environmental Liability and Real Property Transactions 92 (1989)(same). To the extent that its debtors increase the likelihood
of incurring their own liability for inadequate treatment of hazardous wastes, the creditor's risk increases. See H. Chaitman, supra, at 9.02(6)(a)-(c). Therefore, lenders
would likely insist that debtors covenant to comply with applicable environmental regulations, and thus the court's standard of liability is probably unnecessary.
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specific terms is not clear. For example, if "acceptable treatment standards"' 4 7 are unclear or numerous, must or should a lender involve itself
in making the decision as to how waste should be disposed? If so, has the
lender "affect[ed] hazardous waste disposal decisions,"' 48 and thereby
exposed itself to liability under the Fleet Factors analysis?
The creditors' Hobson's choice is apparent: 4 9 under Fleet Factors, it
will likely be liable for its borrowers' environmental misdeeds, so it
should take a more active role in assuring that such misdeeds do not
occur. Yet if the creditor becomes so involved with its debtors, it will
likely be deemed to have participated in management sufficiently to incur
CERCLA liability if pollution in fact occurs.
The court seems to believe that lenders can and should prevent all
hazardous waste problems that their debtors cause. Because this result is
clearly unobtainable, 5 the court's standard makes secured creditors virtual insurers for their debtors insofar as hazardous waste liability is
concerned.' 5
Finally, FleetFactors' amorphous standard of liability promises to produce even more litigation, despite the fact that administrative and legal
expenses already account for as much as sixty percent of all monies spent
on environmental matters.152 The large percentage of funds expended
for litigation is at least partly attributable to the statute's ambiguity and
its perceived unfairness. 153 To the extent that Fleet Factors exacerbates
this situation, it will only engender more litigation.'
147. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
148. Id.
149. See Brodsky, supra note 93, at 3, col. I; Redick, The Polluted Picture on Lender
Liability, Legal Times, Nov. 12, 1990, at S38, col. 3; Eleventh Circuit Rejects Creditor's
Request to Rehear Fleet Factors' Liability Issue, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 252 (1990);
Superfund Report, June 20, 1990, at 5.
150. Lenders, however, simply "do not now have the organizational or technical resources to police borrowers." Dizard, supra note 77, at 41; see also Comment, supra note
13, at 902 (same). But see Note, supra note 11, at 1294 (lenders are well-equipped to
police borrowers).
151. See Leland, supra note 89, at 10, col. 1; see also Fleet CertiorariPetition at 8
("under this vague standard secured lenders, as a practical matter, always will be liable
for CERCLA clean-up costs").
152. See Dizard, supra note 77, at 36; Roberts, Superfund's Costly Failure, Wash.
Times, Sept. 3, 1990, at 63, col. 1. Superfund has been referred to as the "full employment act for lawyers." 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10430, 10430 (1989).
153. This result is partly attributable to the statute's ambiguity and perceived unfairness. Indeed, in a review of litigation under CERCLA in the 1980s, commentators noted
that the statute was "badly drafted and, to the glee of lawyers, silent on many important
issues." Jones & McSlarrow ... But Were Afraid to Ask- Superfund Case Law, 19811989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10430, 10430 (1989).
154. To the extent that Fleet Factorsadds to this ambiguity, it will only engender more
litigation. Cf. Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1986)(uncertain legal
standards engender litigation); Note, supra note 40, at 929-30 & n.27 (uncertain standard
for lender liability results in increased litigation); Burcat, supra note 59, at 10100 ("by
attempting to trap a creditor into paying for such cleanups, the government and creditor
will become inexorably entangled in needless and expensive litigation").
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Fleet Factors' Effect on Small Business

Perhaps the Fleet Factors court construed the exemption so narrowly
because of its restrictive conception of what constitutes public policy. 15
In ignoring policy concerns outside CERCLA, however, the court has
adopted a standard that impinges upon other policy considerations, particularly those involving small business and banking. 5 6
The Fleet Factors decision, if followed by other courts, creates a risk
that certain environmentally sensitive businesses, particularly small businesses, will be denied access to credit.' 57 The risks of lending to such
businesses are open-ended and, under the Fleet Factorsanalysis, virtually
unquantifiable.
Risk that is quantifiable, even if imprecisely, is manageable. Uncertainty, however, can paralyze creditors' decision-making abilities' 5 8 and
cripple the market for credit to certain businesses. 59 As discussed
155. "Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations evidenced in affiliated statutes, or in the known temper of legislative opinion." Frankfurter,
supra note 30, at 539.
156. A thorough discussion of the conflict between the policies embodied in CERCLA
and other important public policies is beyond the scope of this Note. For an extended
discussion of the conflict between bankruptcy law and environmental law, see Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10099 (1983); ABA Meeting Offers Advice to Attorneys on Clash of
Bankruptcy, Environmental Laws, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 26 (1990).
157. See Dizard, supra note 77, at 41; Toman, Environmental Worries Slow Loans to
Small Businesses, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at B2, col. 2; Speakers Discuss Environmental
Liabilities Faced in Making Corporate, Real Estate Deals, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 11
(1990); see also 135 Cong. Rec. E1325 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989)(remarks of Representative LaFalce)(restrictive interpretations of secured-creditor exemption hurting small businesses). Environmentally sensitive businesses include the obvious, like refineries and
chemical plants, as well as the less obvious, like dry cleaners, funeral homes and farms.
See Cope, EPA to Revise Rules on Lender Liability in Toxic Cleanups, Am. Banker, Aug.
6, 1990, at 1, col. 5; Resolution Trust Corp., FDICSeek Limits to Superfund Liability in
CERCLA Amendment, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 324 (1990).
158. Basic economics teaches that
in a world full of risk and uncertainty, it is difficult to know exactly what profit
maximization means, since the firm cannot be sure that a certain level of profit
will result from a certain action. Instead, the best the firm can do is to estimate
that a certain probability distribution of profit levels will result from a certain
action. Under the circumstances, the firm may choose less risky actions, even
though they have a lower expectation of profit than other actions. In a world
where ruin is ruinous, this may be perfectly rationalpolicy.
E. Mansfield, Economics 136 (4th ed. 1983)(introductory economics textbook)(emphasis
added); see also Kupin, New Alterations of the Lender Liability Landscape: CERCLA
After the Fleet Factors Decision, 19 Real Est. L.J. 191, 211 (1991) (Fleet Factors "ignores
the extreme difficulty of estimating environmental clean-up costs"); Connolly, supra note
86, at A11, col. 4 ("the open-ended nature of environmental claims makes adequate pricing and reserving into a guessing game"). Given the potentially ruinous nature of CERCLA liability, it is not surprising that commentators have predicted that creditors would
indeed cease lending to certain environmentally risky businesses. See, e.g., Dizard, supra
note 77, at 36 (lenders will cease funding certain businesses); Freeman, supra note 93, at
20, col. 3 (same); Pollard & Greco, supra note 141, at 4, col. I (same).
159. The credit markets may become unavailable to certain businesses because of the
risks and uncertainties created by the threat of lenders' environmental liability. There are
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above, the Fleet Factors standard creates enormous uncertainty about a
creditor's potential exposure vis-a-vis certain borrowers. 160 If banks cannot measure-and therefore manage--the risk of lending to borrowers in
environmentally sensitive businesses, they will not extend credit to these
borrowers. 161 Small businesses will be particularly affected, a result that
is inconsistent with the federal government's longstanding policy of "improv[ing] and stimulat[ing] the national economy in general and the
small-business segment thereof in particular."' 6 1 In closing, had the
Fleet Factorscourt not limited its analysis of public-policy considerations
essentially two components to a bank's analysis of a borrower's appropriate loan rate
premium. See Flannery, A Portfolio View of Loan Selection and Pricing in Handbook for
Banking Strategy 457, 459-60 (R. Aspinwall & R. Eisenbeis eds. 1985). First, the default
premium accounts for the lender's expected loss on the loan, which is generally computed
with reference to that type of borrowers' default rate. See id. at 460. Second, the bank
computes a risk premium that "compensates the lender for uncertainty about how much
of the loan will be repaid." Id. Both of these components are affected by the open-ended
nature of environmental liability. First, the default premiums for certain industries will
be higher. This result exists independent of lender liability and is beneficial insofar as it
allocates the cost of pollution to those industries that tend to pollute. See S. Rep. No. 73,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985); Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 Harv. J. on Legis. 317, 336-37 (1988); Comment, supra note 13, at 903-04;
Unterberger, Lender Liability Under Superfund: What the Congress Meant to Say Was
... 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 541, 542 (1990)(Part I of a two-part series)[hereinafter
Unterberger1].
The risk premium, however, is particularly affected by lender liability. Lenders already
have to consider the very real possibility that, because of environmental misdeeds and
resultant liability, their borrowers will be unable to repay any of their principle. Under
the Fleet Factors standard, lenders also have to consider-and factor into their pricingthe probability that they will have affirmative obligations to clean up their borrowers'
facilities, an obligation that frequently far exceeds the value of the loan to the polluting
borrower. See 136 Cong. Rec. E1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990)(remarks of Representative
LaFalce); Burkhart, supra, at 344-49; Connolly, supra note 86, at A11, col. 4; see. e.g.,
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575-76 (D. Md.
1986)(cleanup costs approximately 170% of loan's value); see also ABA Statement, supra
note 61, at 2-3 (the breadth of the Fleet Factors decision "calls into question the traditional relationship between secured lenders and their borrowers"). Consequently, many
firms in environmentally sensitive businesses will be unable to afford credit or will have
credit unavailable at any price. See Unterberger, Lender Liability Under Superfund:
What the Congress Meant to Say Was. . ., 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 569, 571-72
(1990)(Part II of a two-part series)[hereinafter Unterberger11]; see also Kupin, supra note
158, at 215 (lenders "will restrict credit generally and particularly to businesses dealing
with hazardous substances").
160. See supra notes 138-154 and accompanying text; UnterbergerII, supra note 159,
at 571-72.
161. See Note, supra note 40, at 934 & n.52.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1988)(Smali Business Investment Act of 1958). This unintended
result has so troubled Representative LaFalce, one of the original sponsors of CERCLA
and chairman of the House Small Business Subcommittee, that he has introduced legislation that would reverse Fleet Factors and restore the secured-creditor exception. See
H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H1505 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990). Representative LaFalce's bill has already attracted as cosponsors "a clear majority of the
House, 272 members." See Letter from Representative LaFalce to Members of the
House of Representatives (Aug. 3, 1990)(on file with the Fordham Law Review). For a
discussion of this and other legislative initiatives, see infra note 204.
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to those expressed in CERCLA, it may have struck a different balance
than it did.

III. HILL V.

EAST ASIATIC CO.

A.

(In re BERGSOE METAL CORP.)

The Facts: A Nominal Owner

In Hill v. East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal),' 63 Bergsoe Metals
Corporation ("BMC" or the "Company") operated a lead-recycling business in St. Helens, Oregon. 1" In December 1978, the Port of St. Helens
(the "Port"), a municipal corporation organized under Oregon law,
agreed to issue industrial development revenue bonds ("IDBs") and pollution control bonds for BMC. 16 5 While the Port held "paper title" to
the property on which the plant was constructed, its "ownership was
merely part of the financing arrangement." ' 166 Essentially, the Port acted
as an intermediary between the investors who bought the IDBs and the
Company. That the amount of the Company's "lease"'' 67 equalled the
principal and interest due on the bonds is indicative of the Port's nominal
role. Moreover, "the leases [gave] to Bergsoe all other traditional indicia
of ownership, such as responsibility for the payment of taxes and for the
purchase of insurance; significantly, the leases assign[ed] 1to6 Bergsoe the
risk of loss from destruction or damage to the property." 1
BMC began to operate the newly constructed plant in 1982. Shortly
thereafter, the Company began experiencing financial difficulties and by
1983 was in default of the leases. 169 The Port, the Company and the
bondholders' indenture trustee subsequently agreed to an arrangement
pursuant to which a third party would manage the facility. Nevertheless,
the facility continued to perform poorly and in October 1986 the inden163. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
164. For a recitation of the facts of the case, see id. at 669-70.
165. An industrial development revenue bond ("IDB") is a bond
issued by a state or local government to finance plants and facilities that are
then leased to private businesses. The purpose of IDBs is to attract industry as
part of local economic development efforts. Their appeal to investors is mainly
that they are tax-exempt . .

.

. Properties financed by IDBs are nominally

owned by the issuing government, but the bonds are the credit responsibility of
the firms that lease the facilities.
J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 180 (1985).
166. Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 671.
167. The Bergsoe court made plain that the Port was the owner of the facility in name
only:
Bergsoe's "rent" was equal to the principal and interest due under the bonds.
The money was to be paid directly to the Bank as trustee for the bondholders.
The leases expired not on a specific date, but when the money owed under the
bonds was paid off. And, when the bonds were paid off, Bergsoe could purchase
full title to the property for the nominal sum of $100.
Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 670.
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ture trustee placed BMC into involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. 7 °
Subsequent to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality discovered that the plant site was contaminated by
various hazardous substances. BMC's trustee in bankruptcy then filed
suit against the Company's shareholders to compel them to clean the
property. 1 ' The shareholders asserted a third-party complaint against
the Port and the indenture trustee, alleging that they were responsible for
the costs associated with cleaning up the property. The Port moved for
summary judgment on the ground that it was not an "owner" for purposes of establishing liability under CERCLA.
The district court
granted the Port's motion." 2
B.

The Ninth Circuit'sLimited Ruling

In an opinion by Judge Kozinski, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court. In order to assert the secured-creditor exception successfully, the Port would have to "demonstrate both
that [it] holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest in the Bergsoe plant and that it did not participate in the management
of the plant."' 7 3
The Bergsoe court began its analysis by examining why "the Port holds
paper title to the Bergsoe plant."' 74 The court concluded that the Port's
"indicia of ownership," in the form of paper title to the plant, constituted
a security interest in the property. 175 It also concluded that there was no
material issue of fact concerning whether the Port held its indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest.
The court then proceeded to analyze whether the Port "participat[ed]
in the management of the Bergsoe recycling plant,"'' 76 in which case it
would not be entitled to assert the protection afforded by the securedcreditor exemption. The court discussed the Fleet Factors decision, and
at least nominally embraced it: "As did the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet
Factors, we hold that a creditor must, as a threshold matter, exercise
actual management authority before it can be held liable for action or
170. See id. A company's creditors may force it into bankruptcy proceedings. See 11
U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988).
171. Hill v. East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal), 910 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1990).
172. There is no district court opinion. The bankruptcy court made certain findings of
fact and conclusions of law regarding the motions that were accepted by the district
court, which then granted the summary judgment motion. See Hill v. East Asiatic Co.
(In re Bergsoe Metal), No. 386-05671 (D. Or. May 2, 1989)(order granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
173. 910 F.2d at 671.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 673 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1987)). The court noted at
the outset of its inquiry regarding the Port's participation in management that,
"[u]nfortunately, CERCLA... provides little guidance as to how much control over a
facility a secured creditor can exert before it will be liable for cleanup." Id. at 672.
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inaction which results in the discharge of hazardous wastes."' 7 7 In fact,
7 ' because the Bergsoe Metal
Judge Kozinski was being gracious,
deci179
Factors.
Fleet
with
odds
at
is
sion
Eschewing the "establishment of a Ninth Circuit rule on this difficult
issue,"' 8 ° the Bergsoe Metal court circumscribed its opinion to the facts
before it. The court declared that "whatever the precise parameters of
'participation,' there must be some actual management of the facility
before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception."'' The panel's
refusal to "engage in [unnecessary] line drawing" ' 2 stands in marked
83
contrast to the sweeping language of the Fleet Factors decision. 1
The court examined the allegations that the Port participated in the
management of the Bergsoe plant. In doing so, it had little difficulty
disposing of the allegation that the Port " 'negotiated and encouraged'
the building of the Bergsoe plant"'8 4 and therefore participated in management: "A secured creditor will always have some input at the planning stages of any large-scale project and, by the extension of financing,
will perforce encourage those projects it feels will be successful. If this
were 'management,' no secured creditor would ever be protected." '8 5
The court next considered whether the Port's rights under the leases
constituted participation in management sufficient to deprive the Port of
protection under the secured-creditor exemption. The court acknowledged the reality of secured lending that "nearly all secured creditors
have [certain] rights."' 8 6 What is critical, it declared, "is not what rights
the Port had, but what it did. The CERCLA security interest exception
uses the active 'participating in management.' Regardless of what rights
177. Id. at 673 n.3.
178. Cf Court Decisions, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 408, 409 (1990)(Judge Kozinski
"interpreted Fleet Factors ... in such a way as to .
give lenders the benefit of the
doubt").
179. Several commentators have so construed the two cases. See, e.g., Berz & Gillon,
supra note 93, at 8 ("Although the decision purports to agree with Fleet Factors, the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the 'capacity to control' test"); Freeman, supra note 93,
at 18, col. 1 (Bergsoe Metal "rejected [the Fleet Factors] standard, at least in its most
extreme form"); Kleege, Banks Welcome Court Ruling on Liability for Environmental
Cleanups, Am. Banker, Aug. 22, 1990, at 30, col. 1 (Bergsoe Metal decision "implicitly
rejects" Fleet Factors); Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990, at B6, col. 1 (Bergsoe decision "appears
to conflict with [Fleet Factors]"). But see Mitchell, Liability Under CERCLA for Indenture Trustees, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 3, col. 2 ("Bergsoe Metals appears to reinforce
and perhaps clarify the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors.").
180. Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 672.
181. Id. (emphasis in original).
182. Id.
183. Compare United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11 th Cir.
1990)("secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose"), petition for cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21,
1990)(No. 90-504).
184. Hill v. East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir.
1990)(citing Brief for Appellant at 19).
185. Id. (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
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it cannot have participated in management if it
the Port may have had,
' 18 7
never exercised them."
While commentators generally reacted favorably to Bergsoe Metal,
their enthusiasm was tempered by the admittedly narrow scope of the
court's opinion.18 8 Because the opinion is limited to its facts, some commentators believe that "its utility to many secured creditors is likely to be
limited" as well.' 8 9 This criticism, however, fails to account for the potential impact Judge Kozinski's narrow interpretation of Fleet Factors
will have on other courts.
IV.

HARMONIZING THE APPARENT CONFLICT:

How SHOULD

COURTS Now RULE?

A.

Follow Judge Kozinski's Lead

The commentators' tentative response to Judge Kozinski's opinion in
Bergsoe Metal results from a superficial and unimaginative reading of the
case. While the opinion is undoubtedly limited to its facts, eschewing the
establishment of a definitive interpretation of the exemption, it is nonetheless significant.19 Had Judge Kozinski written an opinion that explicitly differed with Fleet Factors,the state of this already-confusing area
of law would have been further muddled than it had been in the wake of
Fleet Factors.
Commentators had suggested that the language in Fleet Factors was
9 Indeed, "Fleet's involvement in
considerably broader than its holding.g'
the financial management of the facility was pervasive, if not complete.... Fleet was also involved in the operational management of the
facility." 19' 2 Moreover, "Fleet actively asserted its control over the disposal of hazardous wastes at the site."' 9 3 Accordingly, the court's discussion of capacity to control is irrelevant inasmuch as Fleet actually
controlled hazardous waste disposal decisions. The most expansive and
187. Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted).
188. See e.g., Freeman, supra note 93, at 19, col. 4 (calling the decision "refreshing"
but noting its limited utility); Kleege, supra note 179, at 30, at col. 1 (declaring that
"[l]enders could breathe a small sigh of relief"); 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 408, 409 (Aug.
22, 1990)(decision is reassuring); Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990, at B6, col. I (decision "comfort[ing]" to lenders).
189. Freeman, supra note 93, at 19, col. 4. But see infra notes 190-199 and accompanying text (decision diffuses effect of Fleet Factors).
190. See Kleege, supra note 179, at 30, col. 1; 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 408, 409 (1990).
191. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 93, at 20, col. 2 & n.27 (if limited to its facts, Fleet
Factors does not appreciably expand liability); O'Brien, supra note 80, at 25 (same); 54
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 383, 384 (Sept. 10, 1990)("discussion of power to control as
creating liability is only dictum"); see also Lavelle, A Question of Waste Liability, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 22, col. 1 ("' [Fleet Factors is] a classic instance of a bad case
making bad law.' ")(quoting an environmental attorney).
192. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990)(footnote omitted), petition for cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
193. Id. at 1559 n.13.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

troubling language in Fleet Factors, therefore, is merely dictum. 9 4
Because the Bergsoe Metal opinion was limited to its facts, it is generally viewed as only implicitly conflicting with Fleet Factors.'9 5 In fact,
some commentators do not recognize a conflict at all. 196
Nevertheless,
the utility of the Bergsoe decision is that it buttresses and lends credibility
to a narrow interpretation of Fleet Factors. By construing the Fleet Factors decision strictly in accordance with its facts, Judge Kozinski provides excellent authority for limiting Fleet Factors. Under Bergsoe's
interpretation of Fleet Factors, even district courts in the Eleventh Circuit are not bound to equate capacity to control with lender liability
under CERCLA; 9 7 these courts may reasonably and justifiably regard
Fleet Factors as only slightly broader than Mirabile.' s Had the Bergsoe
court construed Fleet Factorsbroadly-even if simultaneously criticizing
it-it would have strengthened the view that Fleet Factors dramatically
expands liability. Instead, Bergsoe Metal substantially diffuses the influence of Fleet Factors. Other courts should follow Judge Kozinski's
lead. 199
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Fleet Factors court intended to
lay down a broad rule of liability. Therefore, Fleet Factors strong language may be difficult for other courts to ignore. 2" While Bergsoe Metal
is reassuring, it is probably not enough to resolve the uncertainties currently confronting secured creditors.2"' Legislative action is necessary
and, largely because of Fleet Factors, likely forthcoming.
B. Necessity of CongressionalAction
The Fleet Factors decision provided additional impetus to a Congressional movement 20 2 to exempt secured creditors and federal agencies
194. See EPA Draft Proposal,supra note 50, at 668; Freeman, supra note 93, at 20 &
n.27; O'Brien, supra note 80, at 25; Redick, supra note 149, at S38, col. 4.
195. See Kleege, supra note 179, at 30, col. 1.
196. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 179, at 3, col. 2 ("Bergsoe Metals appears to reinforce and perhaps clarify ...Fleet Factors.").
197. See Redick, supra note 149, at S38, col. 4.
198. See O'Brien, supra note 80, at 25. Mirabileheld that a creditor that involves itself
with the operational management of its borrower's facility will be liable. See United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Likewise, Fleet Factors held liable a creditor that "actively asserted its control over the
disposal of hazardous wastes at [its borrower's site] ....
" United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1559 n.13 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504).
199. Indeed, even the EPA has reversed itself and rejected Fleet Factors. See infra note
202.
200. See Redick, supra note 149, at 538, col. 4.
201. See Adler, Courts Split Over Liability of LendersforSite Cleanup, Bus. Ins., Sept.
3, 1990, at 2. See generally Pollard & Greco, supra note 141, at 18, col. 3 (discussing the
uncertainty confronting secured creditors resulting from Fleet Factors).
202. See Redick, supra note 149, at S40, cols. 2-3. This Congressional sentiment has
clearly had a residual impact on the EPA as evidenced rather dramatically in the EPA's
position on the issue of lender liability. The EPA had urged the Fleet Factors court "to
adopt a narrow and strictly literal interpretation of the exemption that excludes from its
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from CERCLA liability explicitly.2 "3 Several bills are currently pending
protection any secured creditor that participates in any manner in the management of a
facility." United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990),
petition for cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1990)(No. 90-504); see also Brief
for United States as Appellee at 40-43, Fleet Factors (No. 89-8094)(urging the court to
interpret exemption as unavailable when creditor participates in any manner in management of a facility). Moreover, as recently as March 1990, the EPA publicly opposed
legislative action to amend CERCLA to exempt secured creditors from liability. See
Marcus, S&L Bailout Facesa Costly New Complication in U.S. Hazardous-Waste Cleanup
Requirement, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1990, reprintedat 136 Cong. Rec. 53088, 53089 (daily
ed. Mar. 22, 1990)(quoting an EPA enforcement lawyer as saying "'[v]e're not ready to
say we'll let lenders off the hook .... We think it's appropriate to have lenders in the
game as well.' ").
After Fleet Factors, however, the EPA reversed itself and in October 1990 circulated
draft rules that would clarify and reassert CERCLA's exemption for secured creditors.
Although the EPA's draft rules are currently undergoing interagency review and have
not been made public, so-called "bootleg" copies of the rules have been disseminated.
The EPA rule as currently formulated rejects the Fleet Factorsstandard. Under the rule,
a lender will lose the protection of the exemption only if it "has materially divested the
borrower of decisionmaking control over facility operations ....
EPA Draft Proposal,
supra note 50, at 671.
EPA's clarification of the secured-creditor exemption undoubtedly will be a relief to
creditors. It will not, however, be sufficient to reverse the effect of Fleet Factors. See Berz
& Gillon, supra note 93, at 9; Adler, supra note 201, at 2; Cope, supra note 157, at 1;
Redick, supra note 149, at S38, col. 2; 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 353, 354 (1990). See
generally O'Brien, EnvironmentalLender Liability: Will An Administrative Fix Work?, 5
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 512 (analyzing effect of EPA-rulemaking and concluding it is
insufficient to bind courts). While the new EPA policy would bind the EPA, it is unclear
what, if any, effect the rule would have upon third parties who sue secured creditors.
Administrative agencies cannot bind the courts to an interpretation of a statute,
whether through rulemaking or otherwise. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 & n.9 (1984); Federal Election Comm'n
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Estate of Sandford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 52
(1939); O'Brien, supra, at 512; Note, supra note 40, at 937 n.64; see, e.g., Amoco Oil Co.
v. Borden Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1989)(rejecting EPA's interpretive rule of
CERCLA's liability scheme and asserting that authority for statutory construction rests
with the courts). The cloud of uncertainty surrounding secured lending in the wake of
Fleet Factors,therefore, remains. For a discussion of the weight courts give to administrative rules when construing statutes, see O'Brien, supra, at 512-15.
203. See Bailey, Banks Seek Another Kind of Bailout, Boston Globe, Sept. 18, 1990, at
39, col. 1; UnterbergerI, supra note 159, at 541, 544. Just last year, legislative action to
amend CERCLA to clarify the secured-creditor exemption seemed "unlikely." See Note,
supra note 40, at 937. Fleet Factors and its ramifications for the federal government's
environmental liability, however, have dramatically changed the situation. See UnterbergerI, supra note 159, at 541; 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 907, 907 (1990).
The specter of CERCLA liability is particularly ominous for the Resolution Trust
Company ("RTC") and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC"). See generally Marcus, S&L Bailout Faces a Costly New Complication in U.S. Hazardous-Waste
Cleanup Requirement, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1990, reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. S3088
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990)(discussing potential environmental liability of RTC). The federal government, through the RTC, owns tens of thousands of properties, many of which
may have environmental problems. See id. The FDIC holds over four hundred contaminated properties. See Bailey, supra, at 39, col. 2. With EPA-financed cleanups averaging
twenty million dollars, see id., the potential cost to the government for cleanups could
run into the billions. This potential liability was the motivation behind Senator Garn's
introduction of legislation to limit Superfund liability for governmental agencies. See 136
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in Congress that would effectively reverse Fleet Factors and restore the
secured-creditor exemption."z° While none of these bills is likely to be
enacted in the near future, they have received considerably more attention since Fleet Factors.
Cong. Rec. S3087-88 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990). For a discussion of this and other legislative initiatives, see infra note 204.
204. Representative LaFalce has introduced a bill that proposes to amend CERCLA's
definition of owner or operator to exclude "[a]ny designated lending institution which
acquires ownership or control of the facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest
held by the person in that facility." H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec.
H1505 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990). The bill defines "designated lending institution" to include "any agency, department, or other unit of the United States Government ... which
makes loans on the security of any facility, including economic and industrial development agencies." Id.
Senator Garn also introduced a bill clarifying the secured-creditor exemption. See 136
Cong. Rec. 53084 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990). After the Fleet Factors decision, he revised
the bill and reintroduced it. See S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S9171
(daily ed. June 28, 1990); Revised Bill Would Protect Lenders, Banking Agencies from
Cleanup Liability, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 232 (1990). It also exempts from liability
certain regulatory agencies, though the exemption for these agencies is lost if they are in
some way responsible for the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. In
contrast to the LaFalce bill, the Garn bill would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act.
The Garn bill does not provide the exemption to persons who, "with actual knowledge
that a hazardous substance or similar material is used, stored, or located on property
described in subsection (b), failed to take all reasonable actions necessary to prevent the
release or disposal of such substance." S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
Finally, the Garn bill accounts for the possibility that creditors could profit from EPAfinanced cleanups of their collateral; the exemption would not apply to the extent of the
benefit conferred on creditors by such EPA action. See UnterbergerI, supra note 159, at
545. However, valuing the benefit conferred by an EPA cleanup may not be easy: "For
example, quantifying the benefit will be difficult if attempted in the context of an EPA
action enforcing a cleanup order against a group of responsible parties well before the
precise value of the restored property is known." Id. at 545 n.20.
There are other legislative initiatives that could relieve secured creditors of liability.
For example, Representative McDade, like Representative LaFalce a member of the
House Small Business Committee, introduced a bill to "amend the Small Business Act to
exempt the U.S. Small Business Administration and SBA lenders from liability for the
cleanup of contaminated sites ... when title or control of a property is conveyed to the
SBA or the lender as a result of foreclosure." 136 Cong. Rec. E3070 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1990)(remarks of Representative McDade); see H.R. 5764, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. This bill
is narrower than the Garn and LaFalce bills because it only exempts the SBA and SBA
lenders, as opposed to all secured creditors. See Letter from Representative McDade to
Members of the House of Representatives, (Oct. 5, 1990)(on file with the Fordham Law
Review). Representative Luken, also a member of the House Small Business Committee,
is apparently contemplating a bill of his own. See Toman, supra note 157, at B2, col. 4.
Representative Weldon has introduced a bill to clarify the scope of the innocent-landowner defense. See H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. E2367 (daily ed.
June 28, 1989). For a discussion of the innocent-landowner defense and the Weldon bill,
see Herbst & Cahalan, supra note 18, at 17, col. 1.
The states have also begun to react to the expansion of environmental liability for
creditors. See Wall St. J., July 2, 1990, at B8, col. 1. Colorado recently enacted a statute
that limits lender liability for environmental damages. See 1990 Colo. Sess. Law 90-1141
(amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-20-701 to 13-20-703). The law does not affect cleanup
liability under CERCLA but it does limit damage suits by adjoining landowners. See
Wall St. J., July 2, 1990, at B8, col. 1.
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These proposals are neither complete nor entirely satisfactory in their
current form; other provisions are needed to amend CERCLA's securedcreditor exemption satisfactorily. Congressional reaffirmation of the secured creditor exemption is relatively straightforward: it entails only a
gesture explicitly demonstrating Congressional intent to exempt creditors
from environmental liability. Nonetheless, in order to assure an effective
and consistent application of any amended exemption, Congress should
address the scope and effect of any legislation it passes. There are several
fundamental issues that any amendment should resolve.
First, Congress must address which statute to amend and how to
amend it.2 "5 Simply amending CERCLA may not be entirely sufficient if
secured creditors may still be potentially liable for their borrowers' environmental misdeeds under other federal statutes.' 6 Furthermore, any
amendment should explicitly address its impact upon state laws that impose cleanup liability.2 07 Amending CERCLA may be a pointless exercise if the specter of lender liability under state environmental statutes
remains.
* Second, Congress must establish some affirmative obligations that
will be required of secured creditors. For example, there should be a
prospective requirement that in order to invoke the secured-creditor exemption, lenders must perform some due diligence of collateral property.20 8 Some standards should be established for what constitutes an
appropriate degree of inquiry, however. Moreover, lenders should not be
able to assert the exemption if they have affirmatively caused or contributed to a release of hazardous substances.
* Third, if the government cleans contaminated property, it should
obtain a priority lien on the property to the extent of its cleanup expenses. 2° While innocent creditors should not be forced to assume ia205. Compare H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H1505 (daily ed. Apr.

4, 1990)(bill would amend CERCLA limiting the liability of lending institutions) with S.

2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)(bill would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
and exempt creditors from liability for all environmental laws that impose strict liability).

206. See, eg., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 177 (W.D.

Mo. 1985)(adopting Special Master's Report holding certain parties liable for cleanup

costs under both CERCLA and RCRA).
207. See Pollard & Greco, supra note 141, at 18, col. 5. Senator Gan's bill would

appear to preempt state law because it exempts creditors from "any law imposing strict
liability for the release, threatened release, storage or disposal of a hazardous substance
...
5."
S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). In contrast, Representative LaFalce's bill
only affords relief from CERCLA liability. See H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
Cong. Rec. H1505 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990).

208. Presumably, prudent lenders have already incorporated such safeguards into their

credit-review procedures. See supra note 146.
209. Several states already have so-called "superlien" provisions. See Billauer, Lender
Liability: The Golden Goose of Environmental Cleanup Legislation, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28,
1989, at 2, col. 3 & n.19. These statutes provide states with a priority lien on property

that they clean up. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1990)(cleanup costs are liens that take precedence over all transfers and encumbrances recorded on

or after June 3, 1985); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11(f) (West 1982 & Supp.

1990)(priority lien created with exception for residential properties). See generally Co-
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bility for their borrowers' environmental misdeeds, neither should
creditors profit at the expense of the federal government. 210 Consideration should also be given to the practical problem of placing a value on
such a lien.
0 Fourth, government agencies' immunity from liability should
transfer to entities that purchase property from such agencies.'
If immunity is not transferable, agencies like the RTC and FDIC will be unable to sell contaminated properties despite changes in the law.
These are but a few of many different concerns that any sensible CERCLA amendment must address, 21 2 and while the secured-creditor exemption must be clarified, this alteration must proceed carefully and
prudently. In correcting its own mistakes and those of aggressive courts
like Fleet Factors, Congress must be thorough and precise to avoid a recurrence of the situation it created in 1980 when CERCLA was hurriedly
enacted.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts have inconsistently interpreted CERCLA's securedcreditor exemption. The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp. exacerbated a difficult situation for creditors
by establishing a nebulous standard of liability that virtually eviscerates
the exemption. Consequently, secured lending to certain businesses, particularly small businesses, threatens to grind to a halt. The subsequent
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Bergsoe Metal, while limited, is significant because it provides a narrow interpretation of Fleet Factors. Other
courts should follow Bergsoe Metal by limiting Fleet Factors to its facts.
Despite the Bergsoe Metal decision, secured creditors still face considerable uncertainty regarding the scope of the secured-creditor exemption.
While an EPA rule on the issue will be a significant step in the right
direction, Congress must amend CERCLA to explicitly restore the secured-creditor exemption. The bills currently pending in Congress are
useful starting points that merit additional discussion.
Sean P. Madden
hen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 99, 115-23
(1986)(discussing state superlien statutes).
210. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md.
1986); Toman, supra note 157, at B2, col. 5; 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 353, 353 (1990).
211. See UnterbergerH1, supra note 159, at 573.
212. For an extended discussion of legislative initiatives and the policy concerns they
raise, see UnterbergerI, supra note 159; UnterbergerII, supra note 159.

